Italy in the First World War

When the western world was plunged into total war, following the murder of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in Serbia on 28 June 1914, Italy at first adopted a stance of neutrality. The Triple Alliance, signed with Austria and Germany in 1882, had crumbled into insignificance over the years, the Germanic countries increasingly mistrusting Italy's overtures to France, not to mention its ambitions over Trieste. The Austrians, for their part, had maltreated Italians living in Trieste, and Italy had not even been consulted over the decision to declare war. Therefore the neutralist tendencies in the country, which consisted mainly of the Catholic Party, the big industrialists and Giolitti, the Italian prime minister, had little difficulty in initially winning the day. In any case, the country was totally unprepared, militarily, financially, and in terms of morale, for a major war. However, a substantial portion of the country's opinion-makers were all for intervention, and their pressure and influence gradually forced Italy to become involved. The nationalists, the freemasons and some socialists, led by the increasingly influential figure of Mussolini, all, for their own different reasons, wanted war. But war against whom?

To many of the nationalists it did not really seem to matter, as long as war there was. The natural side for Italy would have been the Austro-German one, but Austria continued to rebuff Italy's claims to Trieste, there was growing pro-French sentiment in the country, and the best bet for satisfying Italy's lingering colonial ambitions seemed to lie in support for France and Britain. So the new premier, Antonio Salandra, chose to ally Italy to the eventual winning side. Through his foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino, he concluded the secret Treaty of London in April 1915, pitching Italy into the allied camp in return for the promise of substantial territorial gain on the victorious cessation of hostilities. Italy was to receive the Trentino, including the Brenner Pass, Trieste, and land and islands along the Dalmatian coast, as well as colonial possessions in Africa and Asia Minor. The generally apathetic Italian public were roused to a fever pitch of nationalist fervour by the media and by the rousing speeches of D'Annunzio, and on 23 May 1915 Italy declared war on Austria.

The country was as ever totally unprepared for this massive venture. The army was nowhere near being on the appropriate footing, and money for armaments was scarce. Nevertheless, the Italian armies marched into Austrian territory in the northeast, with some success against armed forces who had their hands full elsewhere. The poorly-armed and badly-led peasant conscripts fought bravely on the Isonzo, in the Adige valley, and around Asiago. However, a prolonged stalemate quickly developed which was not broken until the end of 1917. Then the Austrians and Germans, freed from the burden of the Russian front, attacked, inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Italians at the Battle of Caporetto.

The Austro-German armies moved south to threaten the peninsula; Italy seemed to be in grave peril, and British and French troops were despatched to the rescue. The Italians, however, responded to the challenge with great fortitude and spirit. Before the arrival of the Allied forces, the greatly outnumbered Italian army halted the Austro-German advance on the River Piave - a military feat which has gone down in nationalist folklore, and which was celebrated in the patriotic song 'Il Piave mormorò ... non passa lo straniero' (The Piave whispered ... the foreigner shall not pass). By the autumn of 1918 the Italian and Allied forces were driving the Austrians back towards the north.

A notable victory was achieved at the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, and on 4 November 1918 an armistice was concluded with Austria, and the war was over. Italy was on the winning side, but victory had been costly: the effort of mobilising more than five million men over 31/2, years had involved great personal and financial sacrifice. There had been nearly 700,000 casualties; the longer-term cost for democracy in Italy was to be even greater. In the end, the gains from the war certainly did not justify the enormous cost, since the Paris peace conference proved to be a massive comedown for the Italians. They had been foolish to place too much trust in a secret treaty drawn up in the middle of a war, for the US president, Woodrow Wilson, refused to recognise its validity, and the other Allies failed to support the demands of the indecisive and diplomatically naïve Italian representatives, Vittorio Orlando and Sonnino. In the Treaty of Versailles of January 1920 Italy emerged with the promised important gains in the northeast of the country up to the Brenner pass, and with some fairly useless territory in north Africa, but with none of the other territory promised in London. Nationalist opinion in the country was infuriated by the settlement: Italy had won the war, but had lost the peace. It was another nail in the coffin of the Liberal state.

This article is based on material taken from A Traveller's History of Italy (© Valerio Lintner), published by The Windrush Press, and is by kind permission of its author Valerio Lintner.