Berlin: The Status of the post-war city, the Airlift and the Berlin Wall.

Jim Broderick looks at the crisis management of the superpowers during the stand-off over Berlin.

The status of Berlin had been an ongoing problem to the Allies since the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 when the 'Big Three' (Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union) had agreed to divide the defeated Germany into four occupied zones. They also split Berlin, which was located some 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, into four sectors each governed by a military commander from the respective victorious powers. But divisions among the Allies soon emerged concerning the future of Germany in general and Berlin in particular. Instead of treating Germany as a single economic entity - as decided at Potsdam - the Soviet Union governed its zone as if it were an independent unit and opposed Western moves for German reunification along democratic lines.

These disagreements led to the first of the Berlin crises, when in March 1948 the Soviet Union announced a series of measures aimed at curbing access to West Berlin, culminating in the suspension of all rail passenger and freight traffic on June 24th. The ostensible reason for the Soviet blockade was in response to plans for currency union in the newly merged Western sector, but its deeper purpose was to test the commitment of the US to West Berlin. In response, President Truman applied counter-sanctions to Eastern Germany and undertook a massive operation to supply West Berlin by air. The next few months witnessed futile diplomatic negotiations, but the airlift and counter-blockade did eventually cause the Soviet leadership to reconsider its strategy and on May 4th, 1949, after a series of secret meetings of their ambassadors at the UN, the two superpowers agreed to a mutual lifting of restrictions.

Nevertheless, Berlin remained a thorn in the side of US-Soviet relations and the next ten years witnessed an increasing isolation of the Eastern and Western sectors from each other. Then, suddenly in 1958, Soviet premier Khrushchev precipitated the second Berlin crisis when he demanded that a formal German peace treaty be negotiated which legitimised the permanent division of Germany and transformed West Berlin into a 'demilitarised free city'. Moreover, he insisted that the transformation be completed within six months or the Soviet Union would seek an independent solution.

President Eisenhower rejected the demands, observing the United States did not recognise the Eastern German regime and, therefore, could not conclude any separate agreement with it; thus Allied routes and access to Berlin were still governed by agreements concluded at the end of the Second World War. In May 1959 the two sides met in Geneva to hammer out a compromise. However, a stalemate resulted in which the Soviet Union insisted that the Berlin question must be resolved within the next eighteen months. Already, it seems, the Soviet leaders were eyeing the prospect of a new, inexperienced president succeeding Eisenhower.

Having tied his personal prestige to removing this 'splinter from the heart of Europe', Khrushchev used his first meeting with newly-elected J.F. Kennedy at the June 1961 summit meeting in Vienna to restate his position on Berlin. On the second day, the Soviet leader told Kennedy a formal end to the Second World War was needed and recognition should be given to the existence of two separate Germanies. If the Allies could not agree to such a position, the Soviet Union would act unilaterally and sign a peace treaty with East Germany. This would mean an end to the state of war which still existed on paper, abrogating those commitments arising from the terms of the German surrender - including occupation rights, access to West Berlin and the use of land corridors through East Germany. Kennedy responded that Berlin was of the highest concern for the United States and a key national security issue. To lose the right of access would undermine the credibility of US commitments elsewhere and put an end to any hope of German reunification. The tone of the Vienna summit sharpened considerably as attitudes on both sides hardened. Berlin had become a key test of the balance of power, as well as a battle of wills between the two leaders of the superpowers themselves. The conference broke up on a chilling note. Khrushchev repeated his view that any infringement of East German sovereignty would trigger a Soviet response and Kennedy restated the position that the US would not give up its right of access to Berlin, remarking 'It will be a cold winter'.

But that summer proved to be one of the hottest so far in the Berlin saga. On June 15th, the Soviet Union issued an aide-memoire containing an ultimatum that the US must accede to its demands or it would act by the end of the year. Matters reached a flashpoint on August 13th, when, to the complete surprise of Western leaders, the East Germans suddenly began to build what was to become one of the most potent symbols of the Cold War - the Berlin Wall. At the time, the reasons for erecting this massive barrier were unclear. The East had long had a problem with the flow of refugees and escapees trying to cross from one part of the city to the other, but the speed and secrecy with which the wall went up caused consternation in Washington. If nothing else, it represented the severing of families and friends and the hemming- in of the East Berliners, separating them from their 'free' counterparts in the Western sector. It also provided concrete proof that the Soviet Union was intent on sealing off East Germany once and for all.

Since June, both sides had been increasing their level of military preparation and Kennedy immediately authorised the dispatch of 150,000 troops to West Berlin. He also sent Vice President Lyndon Johnson and General Lucius Clay to the city to demonstrate American resolve and to reassure West Berliners that the US was not going to abandon them. The next few months were highly tense, with a number of stand-offs taking place; including, at one point, American and Soviet tanks facing each other in a dangerous game of brinkmanship. According to the testimony of his closest advisers, the American President openly wondered when the 'moment of truth' would come, but the final catastrophe never materialised. The December deadline for American decision passed without the Soviet Union signing a treaty with East Germany and with no denial of land access to West Berlin. Imperceptibly, the sense of crisis ebbed, leaving a shaky and uncertain stand-off between the two military giants.

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